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INTRODUCTION
The Great Lakes Basin is the most important part of the 3,500 mile
border that runs between Canada and the United States.1 It is a fresh
water resource shared by Canada and the United States as sovereign na-
tions, and by the component entities of those unions on both sides of the
international boundary. It is recognized as an increasingly vital resource
due to the water crisis in the western and southwestern states of the
United States and western provinces of Canada. The water shortage cur-
rently afflicting these areas could cause the "water poor" states of the
United States to demand to share in the resources of the "water rich"
states of the Great Lakes Basin.
The Great Lakes are the largest single supply of fresh water in the
world.2 As one author illustrates:
The combination of Lakes Superior, Michigan, Huron, Erie and Onta-
rio covers an area of 95,000 square miles, holds enough water to flood
the entire United States to a depth of ten feet, and contains ninety-nine
percent of the fresh surface water in the United States and twenty per-
cent of the world's supply.3
These waters are international: approximately, fifty-nine percent is Ca-
nadian.4 Even though the diversion of some of the water out of the Basin
could help solve the drought problems in the west, the Great Lakes
States and the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec are concerned by the
suggestion of diversion. In the West the problem is water distribution:
in the East the problem is water quality.
A critical stage has been reached. A potential confrontation is in
the making between the western "water poor" states5 and the "water
* LL.B., LL.M., D.Jur.; Associate Professor of Law Osgoode Hall Law School
I Dworsky, Francis & Swezey, Management of the International Great Lakes, 14 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 103 (1974).
2 Tubbs, Great Lakes Water Diversion: FederalAuthority over Great Lakes Water, 3 DET. C.L.
REv. 919, 921 (1983).
3 Id.
4 Id. at 938. Dworsky, Francis & Swezey, supra note 1, at 105.
5 These consist of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New
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rich" states of the Great Lakes region.6 The "water rich" states are con-
cerned that diversion out of or into the Basin could harm the economic
and environmental health of the region. The Great Lakes influence cli-
matic conditions in the midwest producing better agriculture production
by providing warmer winters and cooler summers.7 Changing the levels
and flows of the lake could alter this pattern. Diversions also would
cause navigational problems and interfere with recreational uses.8
A number of issues are pertinent to this potential confrontation.
First, whether the U.S. Great Lakes States individually, or as a group,
prevent or regulate diversions of Great Lakes water to states outside of
the Basin. Second, provided that the Great Lakes States are constitu-
tionally incapable of preventing diversions, would the United States gov-
ernment succumb to political pressure to force diversions upon the
"water rich" states.9 Third, whether the United States government
would violate its international obligations to another sovereign state -
Canada. The roles can also be reversed. Fourth, provided Canada could
divert water from James Bay and feed it into the Great Lakes for con-
sumptive use in the Basin and possible sale to the United States, whether
Canada would respond to any U.S. objective.
The third and fourth issues are the most crucial issues. They will be
the focal point of any practical debate on this problem. If the United
States federal government is held to have the constitutional authority to
regulate and divert, the United States Great Lakes States would face
grave difficulties absent some political compromise. The prevention of
diversions out of the Great Lakes may come only from the fact the wa-
ters are international, and from the obligations owed to Canada under
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.1" Similarly, any megaproject pro-
posed by Canada and found to be constitutional under Canadian law
could be thwarted by the United States for the same reason.
This paper will not address the constitutional law questions in Can-
ada and the United States; other papers in this symposium will address
the constitutional issues concerning the Great Lakes. The aim of this
paper is to analyse the following: (1) the impact the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 may have on the protection of water quantity in the Great
Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming.
6 These are Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin,
and the Canadian province of Ontario.
7 Tubbs, supra note 2, at 923 note 17 referring to Great Lakes States Seek To Keep Their Water,
N.Y. Times, June 13, 1982, at 30, col. 1.
8 Id.
9 This will not be addressed in this paper.
10 Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters and Boundary Questions, Jan. 11, 1909, United States -
Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448 (1909), T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Waters Treaty].
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Lakes Basin; (2) the fundamental rules of international law relevant to
disputes arising between Canada and the United States concerning diver-
sions out of the Basin in violation of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
or if Canada seeks to divert into the Basin (3) the global international
environmental law rules bearing on this issue; and (4) the options avail-
able on the international level for the states and provinces located in the
Great Lakes Basin.
A. Existing Fundamental Rules Of International Law
Environmental protection appears to be a relatively recent preoccu-
pation of governments and international bodies. However, over the past
ten years the topic of environmental protection has occupied an impor-
tant place in international law. In legal terms, the subject is a novel one;
the law is still developing. There are glaring lacunae in the law and the
fundamental principles which underlie the law are not easily discerned.
Any analysis of international environmental law pertaining to water
quality and quantity must begin with existing rules of public interna-
tional law. 1 Fundamental rules of state sovereignty, territorial integrity,
state responsibility and principles of maritime jurisdiction 2 provide the
basic framework within which international environmental law has
developed.
1. Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity
Sovereignty is sometimes said to be synonymous with indepen-
dence. 3 Care should be taken, however, as independence is a prerequi-
site for a claim to statehood, whereas sovereignty is a legal right that
flows from it. Sovereignty does not mean that a state is beyond the law,
however. Being sovereign, a state has certain rights and corresponding
duties. It includes the right to have exclusive control over its territory,
its population and its domestic affairs. The corollary is the duty of non-
intervention in the affairs of, and territorial sovereignty of, another state.
In the context of international environmental law these principles have a
decided impact. States will claim that they have the right to allow cer-
tain activities to take place on their territory and that other states have
no right to interfere. On the other hand a state which is injured by such
activities can likewise claim that its sovereignty and territorial integrity
have been derogated.
11 S. WILLIAMS & A. DE MESTRAL, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS
INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 251 (1979).
12 This principle of maritime jurisdiction will not be addressed in this paper as it relates more
to cases of transboundary pollution.
13 S. WILLIAMS & A. DE MEsTRAL, supra note 11, at 36. See Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v.
U.S.), Special Agreement, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).
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Several questions arise. With the apparent dangers present to envi-
ronmental well-being, must states be made to limit their sovereignty by
accepting as a mandatory obligation, the necessity to take all possible
measures to prevent environmental damage?14 If such has occurred
within the territory of another state, must states accept as mandatory the
obligation to restore, as far as is possible, the environmental conditions to
their former condition? Is there a duty on states to cooperate with one
another to prevent environmental damage, to mitigate damage 15 and to
exchange information and prevention research data?
2. State Responsibility
State responsibility is a complex area of international law. Many
bodies have attempted to codify it. 6 International law has endeavoured
to develop certain standards and procedures to enable an injured state to
seek redress against the state that has acted in an internationally wrong-
ful manner. There are certain essential characteristics to any claim for
redress: there must be an identifiable obligation existing between the
states concerned; there must be a breach or non-performance of that obli-
gation that is imputable to the state against which the claim is being
made and damage must have resulted. 7 Generally, state responsibility is
concerned with injuries suffered by aliens abroad. However, the princi-
ples can be extended to cover situations into which the environmental
injury cases will fit. Starting from the premise that on the territory of a
state certain conditions shall prevail by which the safety of persons and
property will be guaranteed, it will be seen that states are under an obli-
gation not to pollute and cause serious damage to the air of an adjoining
state.18 This principle, although simple to articulate, has some problems
of practical importance. As stated, the act or omission for which interna-
tional responsibility is sought must be imputable to the state itself. A
state cannot be responsible for acts of private individuals over whom it
has no control. Therefore a link must be found to exist between the state
and the actor who has in fact acted or omitted to act in such a way that
environmental injury has occurred to persons or property in another
state. A state, under the general theory of state responsibility, may en-
gage responsibility in a number of ways. It will be responsible for the
14 See Yates, Unilateral and Multilateral Approaches to Environmental Problems, 21 U. To-
RONTO L.J 182 (1971).
15 Id.
16 For example, the work of the International Law Commission (I.L.C.). See II. BROWNLIE,
SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY 10-21 (1983).
17 The I.L.C. does not appear to view damage as a necessity. See 11 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
182 (1973).
18 Trail Smelter Case (Canada v. United States), Special Agreement, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards
1905 (1938, 1941).
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acts or omissions of its officials that cause injury to aliens or their prop-
erty. Under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility drawn up by the
International Law Commission, 19 acts or omissions imputable to the
state would include those of state organs belonging either to the legisla-
tive, executive, judicial or other branch of government, provided the or-
gan was acting as such in the case in question. There would also be
responsibility for the conduct of organs of a territorial government or
other unit within a federal state.20 A state may not plead a rule or lack of
a rule in its own domestic law as a defence to a claim for state responsi-
bility based on international law.21
A state will also be responsible where its officials have failed to act
diligently and have not prevented the acts of private individuals which
have caused environmental damage abroad. Therefore, the state could be
liable for not having acted in a reasonable way to protect aliens or their
property by allowing injurious acts by individuals or corporations in
their territory.
Responsibility could also arise where, although there is no liability
for the actual injury, no action is .taken by the state to prosecute the
individuals who caused the injuries. It may occur also where there is,
inter alia, a denial or obstruction of access to the courts, an unwarranted
delay in procedure, a manifestly unjust judgment, or no reasonable possi-
bility of adequate compensation.
Of particular relevance and difficulty is the question of liability and
the basis on which it is to be determined. Is it to be based on subjective
fault criteria;22 objective fault criteria23 or strict24 or absolute liability?25
According to many writers it is the objective fault or responsibility prin-
19 International Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/32/183
arts. 508, 10-14 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Draft Articles on State Responsibility].
20 International law has affirmed the liability of a federal state if a constituent member of that
state acts in a manner incompatible with international law. See id art. 6. See also Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, art. 27, (1969) (that a party to a treaty may
not invoke the provisions of its international law as a justification for its failure to perform treaty
obligations. See also id art. 46.
21 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (Fr. v. Switz.) 1932 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 46, at 167 (Judgment of June 7); Cutting v. The King, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 297.
22 For the state to incur responsibility, this concept requires there to be individual blame of the
person. It is necessary to show either dolus (intention) or culpa (blame). I. VAN LIER, ACID RAIN
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 126-27 (1981).
23 If there is a breach of international obligation that can be imputed to the state, responsibility
follows. If the state can show force majeure or an act of a third party it will be exonerated. In this
context, provided that agency and causal connection are established, there is a breach of duty by
result. See id. at 127; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 436-39 (3d ed.
1979).
24 In strict liability a state would be liable for acts or omissions which result in, for example,
pollution on its territory causing injuries in another state, even where it has complied with required
standards of care. Acts of God, acts of third parties or force majeure may exculpate the accused
1986]
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ciple that has been followed by states in their practice, by arbitral tribu-
nals and by the International Court of Justice. 6 It follows that if in the
area of environmental damage fault should play a part, it should only be
in the objective sense.2 7
It has been suggested that the use of strict liability may be still de
legeferenda. However, there is some support for it at the present time. 8
It can be argued that in the Corfu Channel case29 and in the Trail
Smelter arbitration case 10 fault of no kind was established.3" Likewise,
in the Gut-Dam arbitration 2 the tribunal was not interested in fault or
knowledge of prospective injuries by Canada. Canada was held liable.
This decision, however, is of less value when it is noted that Canada had
accepted the obligation of compensation payment in advance. In the Lac
Lanoux33 arbitration between France and Spain, fault on the part of
France was not a requirement. The matter is not addressed in the Stock-
holm Declaration of June 16th, 1972.11 It has been argued that this
might negate any requirement for the establishment of fault.35 Further,
some Organization For Economic Cooperation and Development states
(OECD) have argued that a system of strict liability should be intro-
duced in all cases of transboundary pollution, regardless of any safeguard
measures that have been taken."6
state. See I. VAN LIER, supra note 22, at 127. See also Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progres-
sive Development of International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1189, 1200 (1965).
25 In absolute liability there is total responsibility even if applicable standards of care are com-
plied with. Unlike strict liability, there is no exoneration.
26 For example, I. BROWNLIE, supra note 16, at 437; D. GRIEG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 524
(2d ed. 1976). For use of this principle see the Neer Case (U. S. v. Mex.), United States and Mexican
General Claims Arbitration, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 60, 61 (1926); Roberts Case (U.S. v. Mex.),
United States and Mexican General Claims Arbitration, 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77, 80 (1926); Cair
Case (Fr. v. Mex.), French and Mexican General Claims Arbitration, 5 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 516,
529 (1929).
27 L VAN LiER, supra note 22, at 128.
28 See Goldie, supra note 24, at 1227.
29 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9).
30 Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941).
31 See I. VAN LIER, supra note 22, at 128.
32 Gut-Dam Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 8 I.L.M. 118 (1968). The United States
claimed that Canada had caused damage attributable to the construction and maintenance of a dam
in the international section of the St. Lawrence River. In reaching a settlement, Canada paid to the
United States a lump sum of $350,000 (U.S. currency) in full satisfaction of all claims. Id. at 140.
33 Lac Lanoux Case (Spain v. Fr.), Special Agreement, 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 281 (1957).
34 Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
48/14/Rev. 1, principles 21 and 22 (1972).
35 See I. VAN LIER, supra note 22, at 129. See also J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF
THE ENVIRONMENT: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL ECOLOGICAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION;
Goldie, supra note 24, at 1231.
36 O.E.C.D. Environment Committee, First Interim Report of the Environment Committee to
the Council on Responsibility and Liability of States in Matters of Transfrontier Pollution 16 (Apr.
16, 1976).
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On this basis, it can be argued that strict liability may become, in the
not too distant future, the accepted norm with regard to liability in cus-
tomary international law. 37 This argument is justified if the aforemen-
tioned arbitral decisions, declarations and statements by governments
can be seen to indicate the required state practice and opiniojuris neces-
sary to form a rule of customary international law.38
It is impossible to designate any similar status to the absolute liabil-
ity theory. There is no indication through any of the forms of state prac-
tice or judicial or arbitral decisions that would allow the supposition that
this theory is currently or is imminently on the verge of crystallizing into
a role of customary international law. Unless states agreed to such a rule
of liability in an international agreement, the notion of absolute liability
does not appear to merit practical consideration.39
In the context of massive water diversion into or out of the Great
Lakes Basin we would be faced with a clearer-cut situation. It would not
be a question of determining imputability to the federal governments of
the United States or Canada or lack of due diligence leading to state
responsibility towards each other. Rather, it would be an intentional in-
jury and breach of an international obligation owed reciprocally under
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
In international law the effect of finding of state responsibility is that
the state found responsible to another must make reparation.' The
usual type of reparation for a wrongful act or omission is an indemnity
that corresponds to the damage suffered. In the context of environmen-
tal damage caused by transboundary pollution or water diversion, resti-
tution in the majority of cases would not be a possibility. It is impossible
to re-establish the situation as it existed prior to the delinquent act and
hence to wipe out the consequences of the illegality.4 1 Therefore, com-
pensation in monetary terms and formal apologies, statements of consid-
eration or intent for the future might be in order. It has been suggested
by one author that international tribunals may impose injunctions to re-
strain pollution activities in the future.42 It is submitted that this could
also apply to diversion cases. Also the International Court of Justice
may grant interim measures to prevent further damage ensuing during
37 I. VAN LIER, supra note 22, at 129; Goldie, supra note 24, at 1231.
38 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3 (Judgment
of Feb. 20) (Note the requirements laid down by the I.C.J.).
39 It should be noted that the only cases in which absolute liability has been used are those
arising under conventions that concern nuclear activities. See I. VAN LIER, supra note 22, at 129.
40 See Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B No. 17, at 27 (Judgment of Sept.
13).
41 Id. at 47.
42 1. VAN LIER, supra note 22, at 131.
19861
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
the conduct of an action before it.43
B. The Emerging International Environmental Law
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice4 has
become known as the most authoritative statement as to the content of
the sources of international law.
1. Treaties
Articles 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
does not speak of "treaties". Rather, it refers to "international conven-
tions." The word "convention" in this context means treaty. Treaties
are not only the first source under article 38(1). They represent the most
modern method of creating international law. New global legislation is
needed in many spheres to avert chaos and conflict. Treaties have be-
come of paramount importance in international relations. It must be un-
derstood that the mere fact that a treaty has been signed and ratified by a
requisite number of states45 and has thereby come into force does not
mean that it will bind non-parties.46 On the other hand, where a treaty is
merely a codification of existing customary international law, non-parties
will be bound by the customary rule. Bilateral treaties or treaties be-
tween groups of states on a particular matter constitute law as between
the parties. In the Canada-United States context, therefore, the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty of 1909 is the law appertaining to water quantity in
the Great Lakes and provides for the mutual obligations of the parties.
The two federal states are responsible for any breaches of the Treaty that
are imputable to them. A sufficiently large number of bilateral treaties
on the same topic containing similar provisions would provide evidence,
however, of a rule of customary international law, as they would indicate
uniformity in state practice.
2. Customary International Law
The customary rules of international law may have a bearing on the
problem under consideration. Clearly the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 and any other bilateral agreement have primacy in any Canada-
United States dispute. However, should the relevant bilateral agreements
between Canada and the United States be silent on a matter then the
43 The Electricity Co. of Sofia (Beig. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 79, at 199 (Judg-
ment of Dec. 5); Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards; note especially the Nuclear Test Case
(Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 99 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
44 STATUTE OF THE I.C.J.
45 Treaties generally stipulate the number required for ratification. See Vienna Convention on
The Law of Treaties, supra note 20, art. 11.
46 For an illustration, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 27.
Vol. 18:155
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
rules of customary international law would stop the gap. Secondly,
should the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 be terminated or repudiated
then the rules of custom will be the source of international law that the
governments or any adjudicator would have to turn to.
In any society rules emerge that dictate the allowable modes of be-
havior. An unwritten code of conduct will govern the members of the
group that has produced it. Custom originates and continues to evolve
through such a process. Generally, in international law, custom has been
the centrepiece, until recent years, when a large number of global law-
making treaties has resulted in a decline in its importance as a source of
international law.
In order to determine whether a rule of customary international law
exists, it is necessary to look to the actual practice of states. Custom
must be felt to be obligatory by those states that follow it. Therefore, in
the context of international environmental law, with particular reference
to water diversion, it is necessary to identify state practice and the requi-
site opinio juris on the part of states, to see whether such an unwritten
code operates.
Evidence of customary law may be deduced from several possible
sources. First, from statements and declarations made by government
officials to their legislatures, opinions of legal advisors to their govern-
ments, press releases by governments and published extracts from rele-
vant articles. Second, from similar articles in bilateral or regional
treaties. Third, from the writings of international jurists and the deci-
sions of both national and international courts and tribunals. Fourth,
with the proviso that they do not always attempt to represent existing
international law and are evidence only that those states voting in favour
have accepted them, resolutions or declarations adopted by international
organizations. Fifth, unilateral state action which follows a uniform
pattern.
It has been forcefully argued that customary international law pro-
hibits a state from using its territory in a manner which does not take
into consideration the legitimate rights and interests of other states.4 7
Three important international decisions support this view. The arbitral
tribunal in the Trail Smelter case between Canada and the United States
held that:
under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the
United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its
territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the
territory of another or the properties of persons therein, when the case
is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and
47 Bouchez, Rhine Pollution: International Public Law Aspects, 9 INT'L Bus. LAW 53 (1981).
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convincing evidence.48
The case has been considered as the locus classicus of international
environmental law.4 9 However, it should be noted that what the Tribu-
nal said as to liability can be considered as obiter dicta,50 due to the fact
that Canada had admitted liability for damage suffered in the United
States resulting from sulphur dioxide emissions from the Cominco
smelter at Trail, British Columbia. The Tribunal's function was only to
assess the nature and extent of the compensation to be paid Canada.
Also, the principle of international law stated by the Tribunal can be
questioned as it would be difficult to say that in 1931-41 there was suffi-
cient state practice and opiniojuris. The Tribunal referred also to the law
of the United States.5 Reference to domestic legal systems and decisions
by national tribunals is valid as a subsidiary source of international law.
Nevertheless, the bold principle it was propounding should have found
support in more than a few United States municipal air pollution cases,
as well as to analogies with water pollution. 2 These criticisms aside, it is
clear the holding of the Tribunal has today become an integral part of
international environmental law and can be said to have widespread ac-
ceptance by states.
In the Corfu Channel case the International Court of Justice was
called upon to deal with the question of state responsibility for damage to
the United Kingdom that had emanated from Albania's jurisdiction.
The Court held that it is: "every State's obligation not to allow know-
ingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the right of other
states."
53
Although this decision did not concern environmental damage,
some of the Court's statements can be interpreted as an affirmation of
state responsibility from which it can be inferred that states are under an
obligation not to allow pollution or other forms of environmental dam-
age, that might reasonably be prevented to injure foreign nationals. 4
The arbitral tribunal in the Lac Lanoux case stated:
f
When one examines whether France, either during the discussions
or in her proposals, has given sufficient consideration to Spanish inter-
48 Trail Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1965.
49 Handl, Territorial Sovereignty and the Problem of Transnational Pollution, 69 AM. J. INT'L
L. 50, 60 (1975).
S0 See Bilder, Controlling Great Lakes Pollution: A Study in US-Canadian Environmental
Cooperation in LAW, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
51 It was directed to apply United States law by Article IV of the Special Agreement. Trail
Smelter Case, 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1908.
52 S. Williams, Public International Law Governing Transboundary Pollution, INT'L BUS. LAW.
243 (June, 1984).
53 Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.
54 Id. See J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 69 (1974).
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ests, it must be stressed how closely linked together are the obligation
to take into consideration, in the course of negotiations, adverse inter-
ests and the obligation to give a reasonable place to these interests in
the solution finally adopted. A State is...relieved from giving a reason-
able place to adverse interests in the solution it adopts simply because
the conversation has been interrupted even though due to the intransi-
gence of its partner. On the other hand, in determining the manner in
which a scheme has taken into consideration the interests involved, the
way in which negotiations developed, the total number of the interests
presented, the price which each Party was ready to pay to have those
interests safe-guarded, are all essential factors in establishing the mer-
its of the scheme. .. .
(i) Equitable Utilization or Participation
This theory of equitable utilization, currently described as equitable
participation is clearly accepted by States and can be designated today as
a rule of customary international law. 6
This theory was the basis for "equitable apportionment" in the case
of Kansas v. Colorado57 and was adopted as "equitable utilization" by the
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers adopted
by the International Law Association in 1966.1s The phrase "equitable
participation" can be found in the draft articles on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses adopted by the Interna-
tional Law Commission.5 9
Article IV of the 1966 Helsinki Rules provides that:
[E]ach basin state is entitled within its territory to a reasonable and
equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international
drainage basin.60
Under these rules, basin states include all states whose territories contrib-
ute to the international drainage basin, whether or not they are "ripa-
rian" states. Thus, it is recognized in the Helsinki Rules (which although
not a binding agreement between states, but rather a document produced
by a non-governmental organization seeks to state the rules of customary
55 Lac Lanoux Case, 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 315.
56 See Bourne, Canada and The Law of International Drainage Basins in CANADIAN PERSPEC-
TIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 468, 475 (McDonald, Morris & Johnston
eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as McDonald, Morris & Johnston].
57 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
58 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTy-SECOND CONFERENCE, HEL-
SINKI 484 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules].
59 See First Report on The Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N.
Doc. A/CN. 4/367, at 31 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Eversen Report].
60 See Helsinki rules, supra note 58, art. IV.
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international law)6 that underground waters may contribute to an inter-
national drainage basin. Article IV is illustrative of the key principle of
the Rules, which is that every basin state in an international drainage
basin has the right to reasonable use and an equitable share of the waters
of the basin. The Rules reject outright the "Harmon Doctrine" of unlim-
ited sovereignty. 2 This rejection is based on state practice.63 A basin
state is obligated to look to the rights and needs of other states" and
each is entitled to an equitable share. This latter concept is to provide
the maximum benefit to each basin state from the waters in question,
along with a minimum of detriment.
The determination of what is a reasonable and equitable share is to
be determined "in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular
case." 65 Naturally, rights which are "equal in kind and correlative with
those" of co-basin states will not necessarily mean that the share in the
uses of waters are identical.66 This will depend upon the weight given to
relevant factors.67 The rules consider the reasonable uses of international
drainage basins.68
Article V provides a non-exhaustive list of eleven factors:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent
of the drainage basin in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contri-
bution of water by each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in
particular existing utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each
basin State;
61 See S. Williams, supra note 52, at 247.
62 See Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, at 486 (commentary to article IV).
63 Id. The commentary to article IV states that virtually all states which have considered the
question of the "Harmon Doctrine" have rejected it. For further discussion of this Doctrine see J.
BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 54, at 28.
64 The economic and social needs of co-basin states must be considered.
65 See Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, art. V. This article provides a nonexhaustive list of rele-
vant factors. These guidelines are meant to be flexible and each factor is weighed against the other
factors. None are pre-eminent.
66 See id. at 487 (commentary to art. IV). See also Handl, Balancing of Interests and Interna-
tional Liability for the Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revis-
ited, 13 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 156, 184 (1975).
67 Handl, supra note 66. A conclusion will be reached on the basis of an evaluation of all the
factors taken together. The weight given to each factor is to be determined in comparison with the
other factors. See Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, art. V, para. 3.
68 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, arts. VI-VIII.
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(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the
economic and social needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of waters
of the basin;
(j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-
basin States as a means of adjusting conflict among uses; and
(k) the degree to which the needs of the basin State may be satis-
fied without causing injury to a co-basin State.69
Each of these factors deemed relevant must "aid in the determina-
tion or satisfaction of the social and economic needs of co-basin states."
70
Consider the following scenario:71 In the case of a common drainage
basin where state A, the lower "co-basin" state, uses the waters for irri-
gation purposes but state B, the upper "co-basin" state, wants to produce
hydroelectric power from the shared waters, the question arises as to
whose use is preeminent. The two uses are certainly partially at odds as
the storage period for the hydroelectric power may overlap with the
growing season of crops in state B when the water is needed for nourish-
ment. A number of elements would be crucial to a resolution of this
dilemma. State A has always used the inundation method of irrigation.
An objective study indicates that the use of the water of the basin for
hydroelectric purposes would be more valuable than irrigation methods.
The dam would allow flow control of seasonal flooding and economically
speaking would in the long term result in reasonable agricultural produc-
tivity. However, it would not be as high as that before the dam was built.
Even though the population of state A for many centuries depended
upon the agriculture in the basin area of state A, this is not now the case.
Alternative sources for food are present, but not enough to completely
rule out the need for the old produce area. A survey in state A indicates
that there are substantial underground waters in state A. The new hy-
droelectric production from the basin would benefit several hundred
thousand people in state B. Power obtained from other resources would
cost much more.
The following factors, based on article V would appear relevant: (1)
an existing reasonable use; (2) the relative dependence on the waters; (3)
the population; (4) the climatic and weather conditions; (5) alternative
sources of food in state B; (6) inefficient utilization of water in state B
and (7) the financial status of the two co-basin states.72
An analysis of this situation would probably show that although
69 Id. art. V.
70 Id. at 489 (commentary to art. V).
71 See id.
72 Id. at 490.
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state A has an existing reasonable use, irrigation, the other competing
factors militate for some modification of that use.73 State A has other
sources of food and is using an antiquated method of irrigation which
could be replaced with a system that wastes less of the basin's water.
This replacement would be within state A's economic capacity. The po-
tential use of the water for hydroelectric purposes is very valuable.74 A
balancing here of all the factors would lead to a conclusion that modifica-
tion of A's utilization and accommodation of state B's is desirable.
Reconciliation of the problem between states A and B would seem
to lie in state A either changing its system of irrigation for a more water-
efficient method, using alternate food supplies, using its underground
water, or any combination of all of these options. However, state B
might be required to help bear the costs involved in developing, for ex-
ample, the new system of irrigation, or alternative food supplies.75 Com-
pensation might be required should state A have to abandon any
permanent installations or parts thereof.76
If no combination of the above suggested solutions is agreeable to
both states, then one of the uses, existing irrigation or new hydroelectric
power will prevail with the other use being impaired or stopped. 77 At
that juncture, the state deprived of its use would undoubtedly seek
compensation.78
Basin states79 therefore must share the waters equitably. This prin-
ciple is illustrated further by the international jurisprudence"0 and by
analogy to the new Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982.81
(ii) The "Harmon Doctrine"
This is the most extreme view of plenary territorial jurisdiction.
Broadly speaking, in the context of this study, this doctrine states that
the upper state may divert at will and with no restraints imposed, with-
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 In the I.L.C. Draft on Non-Navigable Uses, these are called "system states."
80 See Lac Lanoux Case, 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 281; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
1969 I.C.J. 3; English Channel Arbitration (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 I.L.M. 397, Fisheries Jurisdiction case
(U.K. v. Ice.) 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25); Continental Shelf Case (Tun. v. Lib.), 1982 I.C.J.
18 (Judgment of Feb. 24).
81 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in
Final.Act of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, THE LAW OF THE SEA 158
(1983) (U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea with Index and Final Act), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/122 (1983). [hereinafter cited as Law of the Sea].
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out regard being paid to the interests of the lower basin. 2
The "Harmon Doctrine," which stemmed from a dispute in 1895
over the right of the United States to divert water from the upper Rio
Grande at a point where the river was totally within the territory of the
United States, was based upon the legal opinion of Attorney General
Judson Harmon in response to questions put to him by the Secretary of
State of the United States. He was asked, inter alia, whether the diver-
sions in the Rio Grande were contrary to the principles of international
law entitling Mexico to be indemnified for any injury suffered. He re-
sponded as follows:
[I]t is evident that what is really contended for is a servitude which
makes the lower country dominant and subjects the upper country to
the burden of arresting its development and denying to its inhabitants
the use of a provision which nature has supplied entirely within its own
territory.8 3
However, in refuting this contention he opined:
The fundamental principle of international law is the absolute sover-
eignty of every nation, as against all others, within its territory. Of the
nature and scope of sovereignty with respect to judicial jurisdiction,
which is one of its elements, Chief Justice Marshall said (Schooner Ex-
change v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch, p. 136):
'The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessar-
ily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not im-
posed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the
extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the
same extent in that power which could impose such restriction. All
exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within
its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself..
They can flow from no other legitimate source.'84
This doctrine could have been ignored. 5 However, it was not. The
United States adhered to it firmly. As one author has stated:
Whether or not the Harmon Doctrine was an accurate statement of the
law, it was at that time and for many years thereafter the view adhered
to by the United States at least when its utilization was questioned by
other states.
86
82 See generally Austin, Canadian-United States Practice and Theory Respecting the Interna-
tional Law of International Rivers: .4 Study of the History and Influence of the Harmon Doctrine, 37
CAN. B. REv. 393 (1959) for an overview of the "Harmon Doctrine".
83 21 Op. Att'y Gen. 274, 281 (1895).
84 Id. at 281-82.
85 Austin, supra note 82, at 408.
86 Bourne, supra note 56, at 472.
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The International Law Association took the view in 196687 that the
"Harmon Doctrine" never had a wide acceptance among states and went
so far as to state that virtually all states which have had occasion to
speak on the matter have rejected it."8
Thus, it is important that in the twentieth century we have seen the
gradual acceptance of the principle that where two or more states share a
common resource due regard must be given to the interests of all parties.
Article X of the Helsinki Rules 1966,89 although dealing with pollution,
is reflective of the general limitation placed by international law upon
state action that would cause injury to another state. It demonstrates
what was stated earlier in the Corfu Channel case.90 Further, the Secre-
tary General of the United Nations has said "there has been general rec-
ognition of the rule that a state must not permit the use of its territory for
purposes injurious to the interests of other States in a manner contrary to
international law." 91 This reflects the principle of law contained in the
latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.,92 This is arguably today
a general principle of law recognized by civilized states which is the third
source of law to be applied by the International Court of Justice under
article 38(l)(c) of its statute.93 This principle can be seen to run through
a number of state to state relationships as demonstrated in the caselaw.
For example, in the Lac Lanoux94 arbitration between France and Spain
the principle was favourably referred to. In the Trail Smelter9 5 case the
tribunal used this principle and in the Italian case of Socidtd Energie
Electrique v. Compagnia Imprese Elettriche Liquri the Court of Cassation
stated:
87 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58.
88 Bourne, supra note 56, at 486.
89 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58.
90 1949 I.C.J. 4. One cited example is the Lauca River dispute between Bolivia and Chile.
Chile, the upper basin state, did not assert the Harmon Doctrine to justify its actions, but instead
recognized that Bolivia had certain rights in the waters. See note from Bolivia's ambassador to the
Chairman of the Council of the Organization of American States, OEA/Ser. B/VI, Apr. 15, 1962.
Another cited example was the Jordan Basin dispute between Israel and various Arab states. Each
side asserted its entitlement to a reasonable share of the basin waters. See U.N. SCOR Supp. (Jan.-
Mar. 1962) at 87-88, U.N. Doc. S/5086 (1962); Eric Johnston Reports Agreements on Sharing of
Jordan Waters, 31 DEP'T ST. BULL. 132 (1954).
91 Survey of International Law in Relation to the Work of Codification of the International
Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Rev. 1 (1949).
92 You should use your property in such a way as to not injure that of another person.
93 Statute of the I.C.J., art. 38, para. C(l). See L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 346
(Lauterpacht ed. 8th ed. 1955) (maintains this position). This would not be at variance with Article
38(2) of the Statute, which states that a matter is not to be decided ex aequo et bono unless the
parties agree. Principles of equitable user would not fall into this category. See Handl, supra note
66.
94 Lac Lanoux Case, 12 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 281.
95 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 1905.
Vol. 18:155
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
If this [state], in the exercise of its sovereign rights is in a position to
establish any regime that it deems most appropriate over the water-
course, it cannot escape the international duty. . . to avoid that, as a
consequence of such a regime, other (co-riparian) states are deprived of
the possibility of utilizing the watercourse for their own national
needs. 9
6
This being said, the equitable utilization theory, or limited sover-
eignty approach, even though gaining ground to the point where it has
attained the status of customary international law, is not a panacea. As
suggested earlier, what is equitable depends upon each individual state of
geographical and economic affairs. 7
(iii) Riparian Rights
In the common law the doctrine of domestic riparian rights has been
stated thus:
Every riparian owner may divert the water of a stream for purposes in
connection with his land, or for other purposes; but he is bound to
return the water. . . substantially undiminished in volume and unal-
tered in character; for a lower riparian owner, subject to the rights of
the upper owner, is entitled to have the water. . . come to him unal-
tered in quality or quantity.98
This principle clearly allows reasonable use as of right by the upper
riparian. However, it has been argued99 that in international law there is
no such upstream right. Accordingly, "upstream states could not utilize
the waters of the basin without the consent of the downstream states
.... "I During the negotiations leading to the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 between Canada and the United States, this was the posi-
tion adopted by Canada.10 1 However, as will be seen, the United States
did not accept it.
(iv) Prior Appropriation
The doctrine of prior appropriation is an articulation of the view
that "first in time, is first in right." 10 2 The doctrine has been analysed in
96 Socit6 Engergie Electrique v. Compagnia Imprese Elettriche Liquri, 9 Ann. Dig. 120, 121
(It. Ct. Cass. 1939).
97 See supra notes 56-80.
98 33 Halsbury's Laws of England (2d ed. 1939) at 559. In the overwhelming majority of
United States jurisdictions, this natural flow doctrine is not the law.
99 Bourne, International Law and Pollution of InternationalRivers and Lakes, 6 U.B.C.L. REv.
115, 119 (1971).
100 Id.
101 This was also the position of Pakistan regarding the Indus River Dispute with India. India
was asserting the Harmon Doctrine. Id.
102 Bourne, supra note 99, at 119.
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this way:
In order to constitute a valid appropriation in this sense a bona fide
intention is necessary to apply the water to a beneficial purpose, fol-
lowed by a diversion of water by means of an artificial installation and
its application to a beneficial purpose within a certain period. Such an
appropriator has a right as against all later claims to the exclusive use
of water to the extent of his actual appropriation. 10 3
This doctrine first developed in the United States. However, in the
Reference by the governments of Canada and the United States to the
International Joint Commission, concerning the waters of the Columbia
River System,"° Canada contended that "the doctrine of prior appropri-
ation has no place in . . . Canadian law."' 0 Clearly, the doctrine
favours those states quickest off the mark in industrialized use of the
waters of the basin. It has been suggested that the upper basin states
reject this notion of prior appropriation as lower basin states, in most
cases, have always seemed to develop ahead of them." 6
This doctrine would clearly be inconsistent with the "Harmon Doc-
trine"10' 7 and with article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, as it
envisages exclusive jurisdiction and control for the upper basin state.10 8
It appears that this doctrine does not have the status of a rule of
customary international law. The practice of states would not seem to be
virtually uniform and the opiniojuris seems lacking.'09 Even in the bilat-
eral Canada-United States situation there does not seem to be consistent
use of this theory so as to create a regional rule of international law.
Preexisting uses, however, are not to be swept aside as unimportant.
Rather, they relate to the principle of equitable utilization."o Prior use
103 F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (R. Bastone trans. 1959).
104 Columbia River Reference, I.J.C. Docket No. 51 (1941) summarized in L. BLOOMFIELD &
G. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES, 169
(1958) [hereinafter cited as L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD].
105 Id. at 169.
106 Bourne, supra note 99, at 120.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 100-101.
108 See McDougall, The Development of International Law With Respect to Trans-Boundary
Water Resources, 9 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 261, 275 (1971). Note that the doctrine was part of the
United States contention in the Souris River Reference, I.J.C. Docket No. 41 (1940), and in the Sage
Creek Reference, I.J.C. Docket No. 54 (1941). In both of those instances the U.S. was the lower
state. In the Waterton-Belly Rivers Reference, I.J.C. Docket No. 57 (1948), it was invoked by Can-
ada, in that case the lower state. The I.J.C. did not make any specific recommendations on this
question.
109 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 20).
110 See supra text accompanying notes 59-88. See also Johnson, Effect of Existing Uses on the
Equitable Apportionment of International Rivers - I An American View, 1 U.B.C.L. REV. 389
(1959) and Goldie, Effect of Existing Uses on the Equitable Apportionment of International Rivers -
II: A Canadian View, 1 U.B.C.L. RE. 399 (1959).
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is one of the factors to be weighed in assessing reasonable and equitable
participation.
(v) Prevention of Injury
So far the discussion has centered around serious or substantial in-
jury being caused to another state. From the international cases ex-
amined it is clear that a duty to prevent, before injury occurs, is not
envisaged explicitly. Nevertheless, it is not going too far to suggest that
if a state is justified in being free from serious damage according to Trail
Smelter, and if a state must not knowingly allow its territory to be used
contrary to other states' rights, according to Corfu Channel, then states
are obliged in international law to prevent serious damage occurring
from cross-border activities. The Helsinki Rules providein article X(i)
for the prevention of any new form of water pollution or any increase in
the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin
that would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin state.
This is consistent with the concept of equitable utilization. The docu-
ments concerning air pollution do not refer to prevention per se.
There is substantial international commitment towards prevention
to be found in international conventions dealing with, for example, mari-
time pollution. The new Law of the Sea Treaty111 would be the most
recent example. Likewise, the Nordic Convention 1 2 is an example of a
regional prevention obligation. It appears that this is the direction that
the law should take, prevention of harm necessarily being better than
reparation after the damage has been done.
(vi) Notification
Lastly, is there a principle which requires a state to notify potential
victims of activities concerning a common shared resource? It is helpful
to an analysis of the diversion question to look by way of analogy to
environmental pollution, for assistance. There is certainly no treaty pro-
vision concerning air pollution, although there is in the area of maritime
pollution.113 The 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty114 provides such an obliga-
tion, as do a number of bilateral and regional treaties." 5 It would seem
to follow reasonably from these documents and from the principle of eq-
uitable utilization of a shared resource that data should be collected and
I Law of the Sea, supra note 81.
112 Convention on the Protection of the Environment, Feb. 19, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M.
591.
113 See Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Air-
craft, Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 262; International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, Jan. 15, 1974, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1319.
114 Law of the Sea, supra note 81.
115 1. VAN LIER, supra note 22, at 119.
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notice given to the other concerned states in cases of proposed diversions
or consumptive use.
State practice, particularly in Europe,116 indicates that there is ex-
change of detailed documentation on such matters. This practice seems
to be accompanied by the requisite opinio juris. Certainly, among states
who practice such notification and feel it obligatory, a regional rule of
customary law has emerged here.
There are several recommendations and resolutions that may evi-
dence a general rule of customary international law here. For example,
the thirty-three recommendations of the Action Plan for the Human En-
vironment117 and the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions of
December 15, 1972118 on cooperation in the field of environment en-
courage exchange of information. The Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States119 provides for a system of information and prior consul-
tations concerning the exploration of natural resources. The ECE Con-
vention12° stipulates that states parties shall exchange information,
consult and develop strategies to combat air pollutants discharge. The
OECD in its recommendations on principles concerning transboundary
pollution 121 had recommended that before the initiation of work that
may cause a risk of transboundary pollution, information should be pro-
vided to the countries that may be protected.
The Helsinki Rules of 1966 recommended:
1. With a view to preventing disputes from arising between basin
States as to their legal rights or other interest, it is recommended that
each basin State furnish relevant and reasonably available information
to the other basin States concerning the waters of a drainage basin
within its territory and its use of, and activities with respect to such
waters.
2. A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in
particular furnish to any other basin State, the interests of which may
be substantially affected, notice of any proposed construction or instal-
lation which would alter the regime of the basin in a way which might
give rise to a dispute as defined in Article XXVI. The notice should
include such essential facts as will permit the recipient to make an as-
sessment of the probable effect of the proposed alteration.
3. A State providing the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of this Ar-
116 Id.
117 Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, supra note 34, at 28. There
was no inclusion of such an obligation in the Stockholm Declaration itself.
118 G.A. Res. 2995, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); and G.A.
Res. 3129, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 48, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
119 G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50-55, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
120 Convention on Long-Range Trans-Boundary Air Pollution, opened for signature Nov. 13,
1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442.
121 O.E.C.D. Doc. C (74) at 224.
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tiele should afford to the recipient a reasonable period of time to make
an assessment of the probable effect of the proposed construction or
installation and to submit its views thereon to the State furnishing the
note.
4. If a State has failed to give the notice referred to in paragraph 2 of
this Article, the alteration by the State in the regime of the drainage
basin shall not be given the weight normally accorded to temporal pri-
ority in use in the event of a determination of what is a reasonable and
equitable share of the waters of the basin. 122
This article is only a recommendation; however in paragraph four,
failure to notify has a legal effect. In 1982, the International Law Associ-
ation made notice a legal requirement.12 3 The 1982 Resolution provided
that:
[B]asin states shall...
(b) notify other states concerned in due time of any activities in their
own territories that may involve a significant threat of, or increase in,
water pollution in the territories of those other states; and (c) promptly
inform states that might be affected, of any sudden change of circum-
stances that may cause or increase water pollution in the territories of
those other states.1 24
At present, it is not clear whether a rule of custom of general appli-
cation has emerged. However, the trend demonstrated especially by the
1982 International Law Association Resolution and by the various other
resolutions would indicate that perhaps this is in the offing. As with the
other areas discussed, what is needed are guidelines for states to follow as
to when information must be given.
(vii) Negotiation
The duty cast upon states in a common resource situation to negoti-
ate is beyond doubt. From state practice and opinio juris it is clearly a
rule of customary international law. In the International Law Associa-
tion's Helsinki Rules of 1966, article XXX stated:
In case of a dispute between States as to their legal rights or other
interest, . . . they should seek a solution by negotiation.
125
This is clearly in keeping with article 33 of the United Nations
122 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, at art. XXIX.
123 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFERENCE, MON-
TREAL, 1982, art. 5, at 5 [hereinafter cited as I.L.A. REPORT]. Note also that the Institute of Inter-
national Law has made notice a rule: see Resolution on the Pollution of Rivers and Lakes in
International Law, 58 ANN. INST. DRorr INT'L 201 (1950) [hereinafter cited as The Athens Rule].
124 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 123.
125 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58.
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Charter12 6 which calls upon the states parties to "seek a solution by ne-
gotiation" in the first instance. 127 This power may be looked at as a pre-
requisite to third party determination of the problem. In effect
adjudication must be an absolute last resort.' 28 Where two or more
states share a common drainage basin the maximum utilization of that
basin to the overall benefit of all parties can only occur where joint plan-
ning has taken place. 129 Cooperative management has to be the answer.
If the states are constantly in a state of friction, only management chaos
will result, perhaps with the deterious effect on both water quantity and
quality.
This desirability to produce an agreement between the concerned
co-basin states was emphasized by the "Rau Commission" in 1941 with
regard to the dispute between Sind and Punjab over the waters of the
Indus River Basin.3 ° The Commission states: "The most satisfactory
settlement of disputes of this kind is by agreement, the parties adopting
the same technical solution of each problem, as if they were a single uni-
fied community undivided by political or administrative frontiers."''
Article XXXI of the Helsinki Rules1 32 recommends that if a ques-
tion or a dispute arises between co-basin states which concerns the pres-
ent or future utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin,
the states should refer the question or dispute to a joint agency. The joint
agency should survey the basin situation and formulate plans or recom-
mendations for the fullest and most efficient use of the waters that will be
in the interest of all the parties.' 33
In international state practice, much use has been made out of such
joint bodies. The best example is the International Joint Commission
which was established pursuant to article VII of the Boundary Waters
126 U.N. CHARTER, art. 33, para. 1.
127 See Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, commentary to art. XXX, at 522.
128 Note that in a domestic interstate dispute the U.S. Supreme Court said in Colorado v.
Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943) that:
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of States in such cases is
that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-sover-
eigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of future
change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial imposition of a
hard and fast rule. Such controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and
agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal Constitution. We say of this
case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such mutual accom-
modation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, instead of invo-
cation of our adjudicatory power.
129 See Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, commentary to art. xxx, at 522.
130 Id. at 523.
131 Laylin & Bianchi, The Role of Adjudiciation in International River Dispute, 53 AM. J. INV'L
L. 30, 33 n. 9 (1959).
132 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58.
133 Id.
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Treaty of 1909. Article IX of that Treaty provides for the reference to
the Commission of "any other question or matters of difference arising
between them involving the rights, obligations or interests of either in
relation to the other." It should be noted that the Treaty betweent the
United States and Canada relating to Co-operative Development of the
Water Resources of the Columbia River Basin of 1961134 was largely
based upon a report prepared by the International Joint Commission.
135
Practice abounds also in other regions of the world. In 1957, Cam-
bodia, Laos, Thailand and Viet Nam set up a Commission for Co-ordina-
tion of Investigations of the Lower Mekong River.136 The International
Law Association in 1966137 also cites as examples of mixed commissions
for cooperation and settlement of differences those set up between Italy
and Switzerland for the regulation of Lake Lugano; Italy and France for
the utilization of the Roja River;138 Switzerland and France for the
Doubs River and the Emosson Hydro-Electric Development; Switzer-
land and Austria for the Inn River; and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and Switzerland for the Upper Rhine Development.
This duty to negotiate has recently been reinforced by the Interna-
tional Law Association in 1982139 and by other international organiza-
tions.14 The caselaw of the International Court of Justice that deals
with shared maritime resources also is indicative of this position.
141
C. Binational International Law - Canada And The United States
The existing fundamental rules of international law and the emerg-
ing international environmental law principles discussed in the first two
sections of this paper apply as customary international law to Canada
134 Treaty Relating to Cooperative Development of the Water Resources of the Columbia
River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638 [hereinafter
cited as Columbia River Treaty].
135 As to The IJ.C. see infra text accompanying notes 162-186, and Sugarman, Binding Ties,
Tying Bonds, 18 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257 (1986). The Commission's work was also used in
coordinating plans for the hydroelectric power use of the waters of the St. Lawrence River: See The
Applications of the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America for
an Order of Approval of the Construction of Certain Works for Development of Power in the Inter-
national Rapids Section of the St. Lawrence River-Order of Approval, I.J.C. Docket No. 68 (1952),
reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY 36 (R. Baxter ed. 1960).
136 See Report to the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East on its Twenty-
Ninth Session (Special), U.N. Doe. E/CN.11/WRD/MKGIL.157/Rev 1 (1966).
137 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58, commentary to art. XXXI, at 526.
138 See Caponera, Lo Status Guiridico dei Fiami e Bacini Internationali en Italia, 15 LA COM-
MuNrrA INTERNAZIONALE 3 (1960).
139 I.L.A. REPORT, supra note 123, art. VI, at 541.
140 See Eversen Report, supra note 59; and The Athens Rule, supra note 122. See also Bourne,
Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212 (1972).
141 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.J.C. 3 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 20), Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (Judgment of July 25).
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and the United States, unless the two states have agreed to a different
formulation. However, the rules of customary international law and the
general principles of law may still be of relevance where a treaty is silent
or where it is in need of interpretation. States will be presumed to be
acting in accordance with accepted principles of international law.
Should a treaty be repudiated or terminated, it will necessarily be to the
sources of custom and general principles that the parties in their negotia-
tions or litigation will have to turn. Both states have endeavoured to
utilize the commonly shared waters between them in an orderly fash-
ion.142 One author states that "on January 1, 1983, some twenty-seven
treaties and other agreements dealing with boundary waters were in force
between the two countries."' 143
For the regulation and management of the Great Lakes Basin it is
therefore necessary to turn to the agreements and treaties between Can-
ada and the United States. As a practical matter only sovereign states
have the international legal personality to enter into treaty arrangements.
The component states of the United States and provinces and territories
of Canada do not have that capacity in international law unless their
respective constitutions give this power. Neither the Canadian nor the
United States constitutions do so. From this perspective, even though
the Great Lakes States and Ontario and Quebec signed the Great Lakes
Charter 1" to provide for consultation and long term cooperative man-
agement and to "conserve the levels and flows of the Great Lakes and
their tributary and connecting waters [and] to protect and conserve the
environmental balance of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem," the Charter
cannot have the force of law as an international agreement because the
states and provinces have no capacity to sign international treaties. Nev-
ertheless, as will be discussed later, this Charter may still provide one
avenue of approach in gaining federal support in both states for water
quantity and quality management in the best interests of the Great
Lakes.
1. The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 signed by Great Britain (on
behalf of Canada) and the United States is still the most important bilat-
eral treaty on the subject of management of the shared fresh water re-
142 Bourne, International Law on Shared Fresh Water Resources, - QUEEN'S L. J. - (1985)
(not yet in print). See generally Cohen, The Regime of Boundary Waters, 111 ACADEMIE DE DROrr
INT'L RECUEIL DES COURS 146 (1975) (on the Canadian and U.S. binational approach).
143 Bourne, supra note 142.
144 Great Lakes Charter, reprinted in GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS TASK FORCE, COUNCIL OF
GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON WATER DIVERSION
AND GREAT LAKES INSTITUTIONS 40 app. III (1985).
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source between the two states today. 45
The preamble to the Treaty details its purpose as being:
[t]o prevent disputes regarding the use of boundary waters and to settle
all questions which are now pending between the United States and the
Dominion of Canada involving the rights, obligations, or interests of
either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along
their common frontier, and to make provision for the adjustment and
settlement of all such questions as may hereafter arise .... 146
The preliminary article defines boundary waters as the waters that
stretch from main shore to main shore of the lakes, rivers and connecting
waterways through which the international boundary passes. It does not
include tributary waters which "in their natural channels would flow into
such lakes, rivers or waterways . . ." or waters flowing from such.147
The Treaty provides in article II that the purpose enunciated in the pre-
amble was to be achieved by granting parties injured by one state's use or
diversion of the tributary waters the same legal remedies as if the injury
took place in the country where such diversion or use occurred.1 48 Sec-
ondly, the Treaty sets up a joint commission, known as the International
Joint Commission, with the requirement that the Commission give ap-
proval before uses, obstructions or diversions, temporary or permanent,
of boundary waters that affect the natural level or flow of the waters
taken place. 49 The International Joint Commission was given the power
to examine, report and make recommendations.
Under articles III and IV the International Joint Commission has a
quasi-judicial role in that it may approve or disapprove of any use, ob-
struction or diversion of boundary waters or waters that flow from
boundary waters or in waters at a lower level than the boundary in rivers
that flow across the boundary, if such would have the effect of raising the
water level on the other side of the boundary, unless agreed to by the
states' parties.150
Conditions of approval may be imposed.151 Such a condition could
be, for example, that injured parties be compensated.
145 Space does not permit a detailed background to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, but
see Bourne, supra note 56, at 469-71; and L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 104, at 1-
37.
146 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, preamble.
147 Lake Michigan is an example. See 0. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT
LAKES 94 (1967).
148 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. II.
149 Id. art. III. Under art. VII, the membership of the I.J.C. was set down: three Canadian
Commissioners and three from the United States.
150 Id. The parties can agree to do so by authority of the United States or Canada within their
respective jurisdictions.
151 Wex, The Legal Status of the International Joint Commission under International and Mu-
nicipal Law, 16 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 276, 289 (1978).
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Under article IX the Commission has an investigative and advisory
role. It may examine and report on any questions that are referred to it
by either the United States or Canada. It may then follow up with con-
clusions and recommendations. Although, the two states could act alone
in referring a matter to the Commission, this has not occurred in prac-
tice.15 2 The reports made 153 are not considered "as decisions of the ques-
tions or matters so submitted either on the facts or the law, and shall in
no way have the character of an arbitral award." '154 Where both parties
consent, the Commission may act as an arbitration panel with a binding
power of decision.1
5
The Commission is given the authority by article XII to employ
technical staff, such as engineers and clerical assistants, to conduct open
hearings, take evidence on oath, compel the attendance of witnesses and
adopt rules of procedure that are in accordance with justice and
equity. 156
Trends before the Commission indicate that although originally the
majority of its cases concerned approval under article III and article IV,
in recent years it has been dealing with references under article IX.5 7
The Commission takes note of Canadian and United States statutes
but has never considered itself bound by them.5 8 It has not applied the
doctrine of stare decisis.15
9
The Commission has had success in the area of adjudication and
advisory opinions. However, it does have some drawbacks, notably that
it is confined by the 1909 Treaty itself and by the appointment of its
Commissioners by the two governments. The United States and Canada
can limit the references made to the Commission. Having said this, prac-
tice seems to show that the Commissioners have handled matters with
neutrality. 16  As one Commissioner himself noted the International
Joint Commission "recognizes neither geographical nor political divi-
sions."' 6 1 Generally speaking, as one author indicates:
the Commission has had a remarkable record of success .... In
152 See Jordan, The International Joint Commission and Canada-United States Boundary Rela-
tions, reprinted in R. McDonald, G. Morris & D. Johnston, supra note 56, at 541.
153 There may be a minority as well as a majority report.
154 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. IX.
155 Id. art. X. See Wex, supra note 151, at 291 (he states that this power has not yet been
used).
156 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. XII.
157 Jordan, supra note 152, at 527.
158 Willoughby, Expectations and Experience 1909-1979, reprinted in I.J.C. SEVENTY YEARS
ON 24, 31 (R. Spencer, J. Kirton & K. Nossal eds. 1981).
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 G. KYTE, ORGANIZATION AND WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION 12
(1937).
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over eighty cases dealt with, it was divided on national lines or failed to
reach an agreement in only three. More importantly, the manner of its
disposition of the questions submitted to it has earned it the confidence
of the governments and citizens of both countries.
162
This being said, it must be realized that in the context of a proposed
large scale water diversion into or out of the Great Lakes, the national
ties of the six Commissioners might well come to the fore. Should either
state propose such a project and the other strenuously object, it would
remain to be seen whether the International Joint Commission is as im-
partial as its record appears to indicate.
(i) Equitable Utilization and the I.J.C.
The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 provides for priority of utili-
zation. Article I states that "navigation of all navigable boundary waters
shall forever [be] free and open for the purposes of commerce to [both
countries] . . . equally . ,,163
At the time the Treaty was entered into, equitable utilization was
not the only principle adhered to by states. It had its competitor, the
already discussed "Harmon Doctrine." 16 Although Canada did not fa-
vour the "Harmon Doctrine" of unlimited territorial sovereignty, the
United States did. For this reason, a compromise was struck in the nego-
tiations and article II of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 was the
end result. Article II provides:
Each of the High Contracting Parties reserves to itself or to the sev-
eral State Governments on the one side and the Dominion or Provin-
cial Governments on the other as the case may be, subject to any treaty
provisions now existing with respect thereto, the exclusive jurisdiction
and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or perma-
nent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural
channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters; but
it is agreed that any interference with or diversion from their natural
channel of such waters on either side of the boundary, resulting in any
injury on the other side of the boundary, shall give rise to the same
rights and entitle the injured parties to the same legal remedies as if
such injury took place in the country where such diversion or interfer-
ence occurs; but this provision shall not apply to cases already existing
or to cases expressly covered by special agreement between parties
hereto.
It is understood, however, that neither of the High Contracting Parties
intends by the foregoing provision to surrender any right, which it may
162 Bourne, supra note 56, at 493.
163 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. I. The same principles are applied to Lake
Michigan.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 88-109.
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have, to object to any interference with or diversions of waters on the
other side of the boundary the effect of which would be productive of
material injury to the navigation interests on its own side of the
boundary. 165
The compromise is clear. Tributary waters are under the plenary
jurisdiction of the state wherein they are located. Unilateral conduct is
thus allowable under the Treaty, but is subject to legal remedies in the
courts of the country causing the injury. However, the remedy is depen-
dent upon the lex loci delicti. This is not that effective a remedy as the
diversion or use will presumably be lawful in that place. This procedure
has yet to be utilized or an attempt made which is indicative of its
shortcomings.
The provisions for tributary waters are to be contrasted with those
relating to boundary waters. Article III states that without the approval
of the International Joint Commission, the natural level and flow of
boundary waters cannot be altered. This provision is based on the need
for joint co-operation and neutral acknowledgment of interests. This is
subject to the proviso that approval need not be obtained when the pro-
posed use of boundary waters is for domestic or sanitary purposes.
Would a large scale diversion of waters out of the Great Lakes Basin
by the United States to flush sewage fall within this exception? One au-
thor 166 suggests that this would not be a reasonable interpretation of arti-
cle III. Also if it would materially injure Canadian navigation it would
fall within the prohibition of article II. Bourne states:
If other interests were affected, Article II would give Canada only the
right to sue for damages or an injunction in the courts of the United
States, provided that the injury was not caused by a diversion already
existing when the BWT was entered into. It is evident that difficult
questions of fact would be involved. 167
Canada has on several occasions claimed that she had the right pur-
suant to article II to divert waters that flow into the United States from
Canada. 168
Neither Canada nor the United States appear to have taken the uni-
lateral route but both have come to accept that in a shared resource situ-
ation, equitable utilization or participation is a norm of customary
international law. 169 Having said this, it is apparent that article II of the
165 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. II.
166 Bourne, supra note 142.
167 Id. In particular, note the dispute between Canada and the United States over the diversion
by the City of Chicago to flush sewage into the Mississippi River which began in 1948.
168 See Souris River Reference, supra note 108; L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra
note 104, at 154; Bourne, The Columbia River Controversy, 37 CAN. BAR. REV. 444, 449 (1959).
169 See supra text accompanying notes 64-90.
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1909 Treaty is still on the books. Should one or the other of the two
states invoke the article, it would be the governing rule. The Treaty obli-
gation would displace the customary source.
This article has been a source of controversy since the Treaty was
negotiated."17 Wilfred Laurier, the Canadian Prime Minister, held that it
was contrary to international law. There was a temptation to reject the
Treaty on account of this, but considerations regarding the overall use of
the Treaty and its desirability prevailed. 7' George Gibbons, the Cana-
dian negotiator, stated categorically that article II was a proper interpre-
tation and statement of international law. 72 The Joint Commission, in
references to it under article IX, has taken the equitable utilization route.
This would indicate that in practice this is the accepted position.
As one author has argued:
It is not clear however, whether the American negotiator, Chandler P.
Anderson, viewed . . .article [II] as an expression of the Harmon
Doctrine or whether he viewed it as a justified distinction between
boundary waters and tributary waters. The difficulty with the article is
that it attempts to impose a simple legal formula upon a complex phys-
ical situation. Some waters are wholly within the territory of one or
the other of the treaty parties, yet they are all part of the same water-
shed, and events in any one part of the watershed may affect the
whole.173
Article VIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 is helpful here in
that it provides, inter alia, that the two parties "shall have, each on its
own side of the boundary, equal and similar rights in the use of the wa-
ters. . . defined as boundary waters." 74 This is similar to the approach
taken by the Helsinki Rules of 1966 T7 as long as "equal" in the Treaty is
synonymous with "equitable" in the Rules. 176
(ii) The Question of Levels and Flows
Article III of the 1909 Treaty provides that the natural levels and
flows of boundary waters cannot be subjected to alteration without the
authority of Canada or the United States, whichever is appropriate, and
170 0. PIPER, supra note 147, at 77.
171 Id. See also HANSARD, XCVIII HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES 911 (1910-11).
172 0. PIPER, supra note 149, at 77 and n. 18.
173 Id. at 78.
174 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10.
175 Helsinki Rules, supra note 58.
176 B. CHAUHAN, SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER DisPuTEs IN INTERNATIONAL
DRAINAGE BASINS 236 (1981). Chauhan seems to think otherwise. He suggests that "equal shar-
ing" has its roots in sovereign equality, whereas the Helsinki Rules of 1966 approach of "equitable
sharing" emphasizes that in spite of sovereignity, equality does not mean an equal division of waters.
Id.
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must have the approval of the Joint Commission. Article IV prohibits
the backing up of waters which would raise the natural level of waters on
the other side of the boundary unless approved by the Joint Commission.
The Treaty, coupled with customary international law, thus pro-
vides for protection in this context. If injury results in violation of these
norms, responsibility by one party to the other state party would follow.
Naturally, should there be a consent validly acquired, there could be no
responsibility and automatic reparation. This would be most relevant to
diversions into the Great Lakes Basin.
(iii) The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978
Even though pollution control was a vital concern at the end of the
last century and leading up to the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, it
was addressed almost as an after-thought in article IV which states: "It
is further agreed that the waters herein defined as boundary waters flow-
ing across the boundary shall not be polluted on either side to the injury
of health or property on the other."' 177 Charles Bourne has commented:
"This commandment 'Thou shalt not pollute the waters' was the only
utterance in the treaty on the subject; it has been the international law
governing the pollution of Canada-United States international water re-
sources for 75 years." '178
Article IV has been referred to in a number of instances. For exam-
ple, the International Joint Commission in the Garrison Diversion Unit
Plan Report stated that if the plan were to be implemented, it would
violate article IV. 179 Notwithstanding article IV, pollution has occurred.
To try to ameliorate the problem and balance conflicting interests, Can-
ada and the United States entered into the Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement in 1972 which was subsequently amended in 1978. It does
not abrogate article IV of the 1909 Treaty but rather supplements it.
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss water quality.
However, in terms of future options it is to be queried whether there is a
sufficient meeting of the minds between Canada and the United States to
negotiate and ratify a Great Lakes Water Quantity Agreement.
(iv) Hierarchy of Priorities
As has been addressed earlier in this paper,"s° there is no specific
automatic preference given of one use over another in customary interna-
177 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. IV.
178 Bourne, supra note 56, at 486.
179 Id.
180 See supra text accompanying notes 64-90. Note that such a rule of automatic preference
would not be feasible in practice. The issue, of necessity, must depend upon all the circumstances of
the case.
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tional law. Nevertheless, article VIII of the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty, as emphasized, does fix an order of preference: uses that are for
domestic and sanitary purposes; uses for navigation and uses for power
and irrigation purposes. This list does not apply to or disturb uses ex-
isting in 1909. It has been argued that this article is outmoded in the
1980's. It does not reflect modem conceptions of environmental protec-
tion181 and is a handicap on the International Joint Commission when it
is trying to function under articles III and IV.182 Customary interna-
tional law here is more modem and relevant today. True as this is, it
unfortunately will not be preferable to the present Canada-United States
position which is governed by the Treaty. An amendment to the 1909
Treaty or an entirely new agreement is needed to bring the water quan-
tity issue in the Great Lakes Basin into the 1980's and beyond into the
next century. Should this be the plan of action, it is the view of this
writer that stress should be put upon the customary international law
rule of equitable utilization or participation.
D. Options For The Future
In the event of a proposed large scale diversion into or out of the
Great Lakes Basin, what would be the options for Canada or the United
States directly, or indirectly, for the group of United States Great Lakes
States and the Province of Ontario? This basic question can be viewed
from a number of perspectives and two scenarios can be visualized.
First, the United States federal government proposes to divert water for
the Great Lakes on a large scale to the western United States, and Can-
ada objects. Secondly, Canada proposes to implement a Quebec project
to divert water from James Bay and send its river-fed fresh water into the
Great Lakes which will be used as a reservoir. Canada proposes to send
this water on to the western provinces and states. Both of these scenario
projects would cost a phenomenally huge amount of money. There
would be definite practical problems in terms of geography, engineering,
and economics as well as domestic and international politics. Both
would cause major alterations to the ecological balance and could have
long term environmental consequences, that are as yet still unknown.
1. Unilateral Action and Protest
(i) Transboundary Tributary Waters
As illustrated in the last section, article II of the Boundary Waters
Treaty of 1909 allows for unilateral diversion of transboundary tributary
181 Cohen, supra note 142, at 225.
182 Bourne, supra note 142.
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waters. The United States and Canada could use this provision concern-
ing such waters. The article provides for entitlement to legal remedies
for the "injured parties" as if the injury occurred in the diverting state.
What does this mean for Canada? Could Canada seek such a remedy?
The United States in the past has claimed that legal remedies in the di-
verting state are only open to "injured parties." Parties is written with a
small "p," meaning private parties and does not refer to the states' par-
ties to the Treaty who are designated "High Contracting Parties." On
this basis the injured state is not to be limited to the redress provided in
article 11.183
Canada has agreed, however, in the context of the Columbia River
diversion, that as the legal remedies are available to the "injured parties"
they are therefore restricted to private persons and a state party would
have no remedy here,184 or elsewhere. This line of reasoning would keep
Canada effectively out of court in the United States.
The right to object to any interference with or diversions of waters
on the other side of the boundary that would produce material injury to
the navigation interests of the objecting state is preserved in the last para-
graph of article II. Canada could object if any diversion or other use of
the tributary transboundary waters produced or would produce "mate-
rial injury" to Canadian navigation interests. This is a very weak re-
sponse, it is submitted. The terms in which this recourse is concluded
would not seem to be in the nature of an effective bar to United States
unilateral action.185 No guideline is given as to what is meant by "mate-
rial." There is no obligation imposed upon the state against which the
objection is levied to heed the objection. In 1909 Canada agreed to this
watery compromise and is unfortunately bound by its strictures unless
the Treaty is amended or terminated.
(ii) Boundary Waters
With respect to boundary waters, on the other hand, the United
States could not divert out of, obstruct or otherwise use these waters,
whether temporarily or permanently, where such would affect the natu-
ral level or flow on the other side of the line, unless it obtained the ap-
proval of the International Joint Commission. One writer has suggested
that the legal problems of adding water rather than taking away have not
been touched upon to any extent and that in the absence of consent the
legal solutions in the absence of specific treaty provisions will lie in the
183 L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 104, at 47.
184 Id. at 48. As the United States insisted in 1909 on this inclusion of the "Harmon Doctrine"
it is surprising to see this overextension of the compromise struck.
185 O. PIPER, supra note 147, at 79.
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general principles of law.186 The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 ad-
dresses the issue of flooding in article IV, and article III prohibits as
indicated above that the unilateral raising of levels and flows within the
consent of the International Joint Commission is prohibited. It goes no
further than this but this writer is of the view that these provisions would
cover the situation.
It should be noted that article III specifically excludes the necessity
of obtaining the other state's consent by the use of the word "or." No
such order concerning boundary waters shall be given "except by author-
ity of the United States or the Dominion of Canada . .. "187 It would
seem unlikely that, should Canada object, the Commissioners could in
reality sit as impartial adjudicators and not as government appointees.
Should the three Canadian Commissioners object to the proposal then a
stalemate would result. Under article VIII it would then be up to Can-
ada and the United States to try to reach an agreement. If such an agree-
ment is reached it would then be communicated to the Commissioners
who would take further steps to see to the carrying out of the agreement.
There is the possibility that Canada and the United States could
utilize the procedure laid down in article X, whereby any questions in-
volving, inter alia, the rights, obligations or interests of the United States
or Canada in relation to each other, may be referred to the International
Joint Commission by the consent of the two states. The terms of refer-
ence will dictate the mode in which the International Joint Commission
will operate. Under this article the International Joint Commission acts
as an arbitral tribunal. This has yet to be utilized. The jurisdiction of the
Commission is clearly not compulsory, the words of article X stating that
"matters of difference. . . may be referred for decision. . . ." Refer-
ence is made by the United States by and with the consent of the Senate
and on that part of Canada with the consent of the Senate and on the
part of Canada with the consent of the Governor General in Council.
Article X is couched in stronger terms than article IX, which autho-
rizes the Commission to examine and report upon the facts and circum-
stances of the particular question, together with conclusions and
recommendations as seem appropriate, when a matter is referred to it by
either of the states' parties. Article X provides for a power to make a
"decision" and not simply a report or recommendation. Here, however,
the consent of both states is mandated.
In a referral for decision under article X, should the Commission be
divided equally or is, for some other reason, not able to render a decision
on the particular question or matter, the Commissioners are duty bound
to make a joint report to both the Canadian and United States govern-
186 Bourne, supra note 56, at 484.
187 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. I1.
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ments, or, if this is not agreeable to the Commissioners, separate reports
to their respective governments. This report or reports will indicate the
different conclusions arrived at. Thereupon, the two states will refer the
question or matter to an umpire chosen in accordance with article XLV,
paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settle-
ment of International Disputes of 1907. This umpire has the power to
render a final decision with respect to the matters and questions referred
upon which the Commissioners of the International Joint Commission
failed to agree.
In theory this procedure outlined in article X would appear to offer
a method for solving a dispute between Canada and the United States
over water quantity questions in the Great Lakes Basin. However, both
states must have the will to use this method and be bound in good faith
by the final decision. The use of the Treaty provisions for investigative
work and reporting on factual matters provided by article IX is one
thing, but the use of the article X mechanism is another. It necessitates
that the two states, having failed to settle a controversy by diplomatic
negotiation, use an impartial arbiter. It remains to be seen whether the
International Joint Commission and the umpire method is the route to
take.
To date this role as arbiter has not been utilized. Still, as has been
pointed out by two authors:
If the Commission does not, at the moment, appear to have any pros-
pects of acting as an arbitral tribunal under article X, this should be a
cause for rejoicing because it would mean that the other processes of
consultation between Canada and the United States have functioned so
well that no recourse to arbitration has been necessary. 188
Only the next few years will tell whether these consultative processes will
work in this acutely controversial and important area.
(iii) Conclusions on Unilateral Action
Clearly, the United States or Canada could act unilaterally and be
within the terms of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 if any interfer-
ence or division relates solely to transboundary tributary waters. How-
ever, boundary waters are protected by the mechanisms of the Treaty
needing the approval of the International Joint Commission. If approval
is refused or a stalemate reached and the other state unilaterally goes
ahead, this would violate the provisions of the Treaty and would result in
state responsibility.189 Such a material breach would also terminate the
Treaty if the other party so wished.190
188 L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 104, at 61.
189 See supra text accompanying notes 16-43 for the principles of state responsibility.
190 See infra text accompanying notes 204-208.
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2. Interpretation of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
Article VIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 provides that in
cases under articles III and IV where approval of the International Joint
Commission is required, the Commission in passing upon such cases
shall be governed by rules or principles adopted by the parties. These
rules, which are also contained in article VIII are as follows: first, the
states have equal and similar rights in the use of boundary waters on
their respective sides of the boundary; secondly, the Commission in mak-
ing its consideration shall observe the following order of preference
among the various uses of such boundary waters:
(1) Uses for domestic and sanitary purposes,
(2) Uses for navigation, including the service of canals for the
purposes of navigation,
(3) Uses for power and for irrigation purposes.
However, no use shall be permitted where it will materially conflict with
or restrain any other use which is given preference over it in the afore-
mentioned order of preference. The Commission has the discretion to
make its approval conditional upon remedial or protective works being
constructed to compensate as far as possible for the particular proposed
use or diversion. It may require that suitable and adequate provision be
made for indemnity and protection against injury. The Treaty clearly
envisages in article VIII that the Commission may in fact authorize
projects that cause damage to the other state party. 191
Thus, in exercising its power to approve or disapprove of projects
the Commission is bound to follow the regime laid down by the Treaty.
However, the question that is apparent is whether in interpreting such
words as "equal and similar rights" and "materially to conflict" the
Commission could turn to customary international law or the general
principles of law to aid it in reaching an interpretation.
A bilateral treaty is a treaty-contract and is a mode of creating spe-
cial rights and obligations akin to a domestic law private contract. The
parties are bound by the principle pacta sunt servanda to act in good
faith. Treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral law-making treaties of
general application, are nevertheless void if they conflict with a rule of
custom that is part of the jus cogens. Jus cogens has been defined as
consisting of preremptory norms of international law from which there
can be no derogation. In the area of international environmental protec-
tion however, there is no argument to be made that the protection of
water quality or quantity falls into this category. Therefore, it would be
impossible to suggest thatjus cogens encompasses a state's right to pre-
191 See L. BLOOMFIELD & G. FITZGERALD, supra note 104, at 29.
19861
CASE W. RES. . INT'L L.
vent changes in water quantity.192
(i) International Rules of Treaty Interpretation
According to article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties of 1969, a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and also in the light of [the] object and purpose [of the treaty]. 193
Article 31 further provides:
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made be-
tween all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty;
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding
the interpretation of the treaty or application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established
that the parties so intend. 
94
The International Court of Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the
Constitution of the Maritime Consultative Organization 9 and the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights in the Golder case196 have reaffirmed the
principle of interpretation according to the ordinary meaning rule. This
is a codification of customary international law. As Starke comments:
"The related rules concerning the intention of the parties proceed from
the capital principle that it is to the intention of the parties at the time
the instrument was concluded, and in particular the meaning attached by
them to words and phrases at the time. . ,,197 It is to be emphasized
that the critical time for ascertaining such intention is the conclusion of
the treaty. Starke argues further that "[i]n accordance with the principle
of consistency, treaties should be interpreted in the light of existing inter-
192 The only areas where agreement has been shown as to what is encompassed by the jus
cogens are: wars of aggression, acts of genocide, and other substantial infringements of human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
193 Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 31, para. 1 at 691.
194 Id. para. 2-4 at 692.
195 Advisory Opinion on the Constitution of the Maritime Safety of the International Maritime
Consultative Organization, 1960 I.C.J. 150, 159.
196 Golder Case, 18 Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts. 456 (1975).
197 J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (9th ed. 1984).
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national law."'1 98 Can it therefore be argued that articles III and VIII of
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 must be interpreted as conforming
to the customary international law rule of equitable utilization? It is sub-
mitted that in this regard article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties quoted above is instructive. It stipulates, inter alia,
that any subsequent conduct of the parties to a treaty that establishes the
agreement of the parties as to its interpretation shall be taken into
account.
On this basis it is important to try and document the conduct of the
United States and Canada since 1909. It was stated earlier in this pa-
per1 99 that Canada had not supported the plenary jurisdiction approach
in 1909. Canada's preference lay in the adoption of the common law
rules of absolute territorial integrity or riparian rights.200 As one author
has commented: "Under that Rule, a state cannot lawfully utilize the
waters of an international drainage basin in its territory if its doing so
will cause injury in the territory of a co-basin unless that co-basin con-
sents to the utilization."' This was in direct opposition to the United
States "Harmon Doctrine." Neither of these two viewpoints has been
taken up by the international community and both have been decried. 2
It is the doctrine of equitable utilization or participation that has pre-
vailed internationally.
It has been suggested that the United States has proferred evidence
by its conduct that it has "abandoned its adherence to the Harmon Doc-
trine and now accepts the doctrine of equitable utilization."2 3 This evi-
dence is to be gleaned from various statements made by United States
officials over the years. However, as Bourne suggests, the statements do
tend to be equivocal and do leave room for a certain amount of doubt.2"
Likewise, Canada has never in an outright fashion espoused equitable
participation but rather that "a state is under a legal obligation to take
account of the interests of co-basin states and not heedlessly and unrea-
sonably inflict serious injury upon them." 05"
In their relations over boundary waters since 1909, Canada and the
United States have based their arguments and responses upon the 1909
Treaty and other relevant agreements binding upon them. They have not
looked to customary international law. Nevertheless, in its statement of
198 Id. at 457.
199 See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
200 Boume, supra note 56, at 474.
201 Id.
202 Id. See also SMITH, THE ECONOMIC USES OF INTERNATIONAL RIVERS 8, 145-47 (1931);
Bourne, supra note 56, at 475.
203 Bourne, supra note 56, at 475.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 476.
1986]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
principles concerning the apportioning of benefits from the cooperative
use of the Columbia River, the International Joint Commission began by
stating that:
"[It] was guided by the basic concept that the principles recommended
herein should result in an equitable sharing of the benefits attributable
to their cooperative undertakings."20
6
This statement certainly supports the argument that the Commission will
interpret article VIII as being founded on equitable participation of both
Canada and the United States. This would seem to indicate that the
"equal and similar" rights of article VIII would be treatment as equal
utilization or participation.
One problem remains: will the Commission, in interpreting article
VIII, follow the order of preference laid down for the various uses? It
was discussed earlier20 7 that under article VI of the Helsinki Rules20
there is no hierarchy of uses. Necessarily, priority of usage has to be
flexible to operate successfully in a common drainage basin situation. It
depends upon the individual facts and circumstances of the particular
case.
In 1909 it was thought by both Canada and the United States that
navigation should be given a priority status. Today, arguably, other utili-
zations have as much benefit to both sides of the border. In addition,
article VIII is unclear in its overall meaning. Should Canada or the
United States have in clear terms exercised their equal share of the wa-
ters could they still turn to the scheme of preferences and say that a
further use should have priority over proposals from the other side? It
has been suggested that in such a circumstance it would be the equal
rights principle that would be dominant and the order of priorities
should not be used to derogate from it.209 It is hoped that in any case of
potential conflict that this is the route of interpretation that the Commis-
sion would take.
It is evident that these priorities fixed seventy-six years ago are no
longer appropriate in these last years of the twentieth century. As Max-
well Cohen has aptly stated: they do not include any statement that
would reflect the modern environmental, recreational, quality-of-life,
"Stockholm" kind of language, and there is nothing here about
fisheries."210
Bourne 21" argues, and this writer agrees, that the present state of
206 Columbia River Treaty, supra note 134.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 56-80.
208 See Helsinki Rules, supra note 58.
209 See Bourne, supra note 56, at 482.
210 Cohen, supra note 142, at 225.
211 Bourne, supra note 142.
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order of priorities handicaps the Commission in the discharge of its re-
sponsibilities under articles III and IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909. The rules of customary international law would be more
beneficial.
(ii) Termination of a Treaty
The termination of a treaty may take place in conformity with the
provisions of the treaty, or at any time where there is the consent of all
the parties after there has been consultation with the other states
parties.212
Article XIV of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 provides that
the said treaty will remain in force for five years, dating from the ex-
change of ratifications, and thereafter until it is terminated by twelve
months' written notice given by either High Contracting Party to the
other.213 Thus, should the United States or Canada want to divert or
otherwise interfere with the Great Lakes Basin boundary waters either
without getting the approval of the International Joint Commission or
having sought it, contravening its refusal to approve, or incapacity to
approve, they could then withdraw from the Treaty relationship. To do
so, written notice to the other party would have to be given twelve
months in advance. Once withdrawn from the treaty relationship and
commitment the parties will be bound to abide by the relevant rules of
customary international law and the general principles of law.214 The
withdrawing state would be bound by the earlier discussed customary
rules of international law215 unless in the period of termination and pro-
ject initiation it has demonstrated that it does not consider itself to be
bound by any custom relating to equitable participation. 216
If the case were to arise in which the United States unilaterally di-
verted water out of boundary waters in breach of the 1909 Treaty, this
would entitle Canada to terminate the Treaty. If Canada was to unilater-
ally divert into the boundary waters, likewise the United States would be
so entitled. Again there would be a reversion to the rules of customary
international law not only as regards boundary waters but also trans-
boundary tributary waters.
212 Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 54.
213 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 10, art. XIV.
214 The Treaty could also be suspended for a period of time agreed upon by the parties.
215 See supra text accompanying notes 56-80.
216 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den. and Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judg-
ment of Feb. 20) question of the binding force of custom).
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3. Peaceful Settlement of Canada-United States International
Water Disputes
As water as a resource becomes of paramount importance to Can-
ada and the United States, the strictures of the Boundary Waters Treaty
of 1909 may become distasteful to both parties. To avoid confrontation
what are the possible solutions?
(i) The International Joint Commission
The role of this body has already been addressed. However, it
should be noted that in article XIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909 so-called "special agreements" are possible between the contracting
parties. By entering into such, Canada and the United States could agree
to a resolution of a potential conflict situation without recourse to the
Commission. Article XIII provides further that these agreements need
not be direct but also may occur when a mutual arrangement can be
identified through concurrent or reciprocal legislation in both
countries. 17
(ii) Negotiation 218
The primary means of settling disputes between states is the time
honoured process of negotiation. Its importance cannot be overstressed
in international conflict resolution. It is a means of direct contact be-
tween states. So common and pervasive is this procedure that those re-
sponsible for conflict management, statesmen, diplomats and other
public servants involved tend to distrust any other means. It would be a
hard task to calculate exactly what percentage of disputes are resolved by
negotiation but it would include the vast majority. Today, negotiation as
a mechanism of dispute settlement pervades every aspect of international
law and it is the primary means of expression and contact between
governments.
Despite its all-pervasive character, nothing is more difficult to de-
scribe than the negotiation process. It exists in so many contexts and for
so many purposes that few generalizations by way of description give a
clear picture. There is no precise form of negotiation. On the contrary,
different states, different departments of the same government and above
all different negotiators develop their own style. The personal element
should not be underestimated. Where one negotiator fails another may
do very well.
Negotiations are said to take place at different levels according to
the people involved. The range is from summit conferences composed of
217 See Cohen, supra note 142.
218 This section is based on S. WILLIAMS & A. DE MESTRAL, supra note 11, at 281.
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heads of state, to ministerial meetings, ambassadorial meetings, meetings
of particular bureau diplomats and the most popular, working meetings
of officials drawn from the respective departments of government having
expertise in the particular area. In this latter case the negotiations are
usually completed by the attendance of diplomats from the local embassy
or envoys from the capitals. Negotiations can be formal or informal de-
pending upon the state of the negotiations or the purpose and importance
of the negotiations. Formal negotiations are conducted in a more struc-
tured manner and are usually completed by the issuance of a joint com-
munique or by the signature of an understanding or a treaty.
Canada and the United States could certainly agree outside of any
existing treaty relationship to divert water out of or into the Great Lakes
Basin. Should this be done, the several Great Lakes States of the United
States and the Province of Ontario would have no recourse absent any
constitutional arguments existing at their respective constitutional levels.
This type of negotiated "special agreement" would fall within the provi-
sions of article XIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909.
(iii) Good Offices, Mediation, Conciliation, Fact-Finding, Notification,
and Consultation.219
These procedures are an adjunct to negotiation. To a lesser extent
they are alternatives to arbitral or judicial settlement. They represent an
added degree of formality and structure beyond the negotiating process.
(a) Good Offices
These are lent by a head of state or high international official such as
the Secretary General of the United Nations to states involved in a dis-
pute, where an offer is made of personal intervention or the provision of
facilities to assist in the resolution of the dispute.
(b) Meditation
Where the parties either through a treaty provision or an ad hoc
agreement seek a third party, a head of state or a statesman, or an inter-
national institution may be invited to mediate. Mediation can involve a
variety of forms but usually involves meetings with the mediator and the
disputing states parties in the country of either the mediator or the dispu-
tants. It is submitted that Canada and the -United States are unlikely to
follow this course.
(c) Conciliation
By conciliation is meant the process by which the parties to a dis-
pute either agree in advance or by an ad hoc agreement to submit their
difficulties directly to a third party in order to be assisted in reaching a
solution. The decision, if the parties ask the conciliator to make one, can
219 Id. at 282-85.
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be similar to an arbitral award - with the major difference being that it
is not binding on the parties. For this reason, conciliation is not a viable
option here. It could go no further than the process of the International
Joint Commission.
(d) Fact Finding
This process seeks to use a neutral procedure for fact finding which
may be relevant to a dispute. Fact finding may be conducted on an ad
hoc basis or may be provided for in an arbitral or judicial procedure such
as article 66 of the Rules of Court of the International Court of
Justice.22 °
In the instant case of boundary water disputes, however, we have
one of the most renowned examples of the successful use of fact finding
as a dispute avoidance method in the International Joint Commission. If
the present scheme of dispute avoidance and dispute management tech-
niques under this scheme is not successful in quantity issues, it is not
suggested that we should turn to other bodies for this role.
(e) Notification221
This is more applicable to dispute avoidance then dispute
settlement.
(f) Consultation, The Duty to Negotiate222
D. Arbitration
Arbitration provides an important means of adjudication of disputes
in cases where states do not judge it appropriate to submit their dispute
to adjudication by an already existing international tribunal.
Modern adjudication is said to have begun with the Jay Treaty of
1794 between the United States and Great Britain which established
three "joint commissions" to resolve disputes concerning North America
which had not been settled during the course of negotiations.223
During the nineteenth century, European states had increasing re-
course to arbitration as a means of dispute settlement. Arbitration was
used either on an ad hoc basis for a single dispute, or provided for in a
final articles of bilateral or multilateral treaties in the event of future dis-
putes. Some states such as the United States and Mexico set up perma-
nent arbitral procedures for the settlement of claims against each other.
This practice reached its apogee with the creation of the Permanent
Court of International Arbitration under the 1899 and 1907 Hague Con-
ventions on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. The Court,
which exists to this day, is composed of panels of persons named by their
220 International Court of Justice, Rules of Court, 17 I.L.M. 1286, 1297 (1978).
221 See supra text accompanying notes 113-122.
222 See supra text accompanying notes 123-139.
223 See J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 516 (8th ed. 1977).
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governments from which arbitrators can be chosen. Arbitration is an
important element of the 1928 General Act and has continued through-
out this century to be one of the most frequently chosen forms of binding
dispute settlement to be included in the final articles of bilateral and mul-
tilateral treaties. Arbitration is even more important in settlement of pri-
vate business disputes. Here there exist important arbitral procedures
established by the International Chamber of Commerce, the American
Arbitration Association, the All-Union Chamber of Commerce in Mos-
cow and most recently by the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law.
Canada, during the period when the United Kingdom retained re-
sponsibility for its foreign affairs and subsequently, has been a party to a
number of important arbitrations with the United States. Among these
were the 1871 Treaty of Washington Arbitration concerning the Canada-
United States boundary in the strait of Juan de Fuca; the Bering Sea
Arbitration; the Alaska Boundary Arbitration of 1903; the 1909 North
Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration; the Trail Smelter Arbitration to name but
the most important.
The procedures of international arbitration do not differ from the
basic elements of arbitral procedures existing in domestic legal systems.
Unlike judicial procedures, arbitral procedures are chosen by the parties.
They may choose an ad hoc basis or they may choose in advance. Even
where they choose in advance, it is necessary to form the arbitral ques-
tion or compromis for submission to the arbitrator. The arbitrator or
panel of arbitration can be established in advance as with a permanent
arbitral tribunal; usually they are to be drawn from a pre-existing list. It
is common for both parties to name an arbitrator and then for their nom-
inees to choose a president of the panel or "umpire." The rules of proce-
dure may be determined in advance by the parties, by the arbitrators if
they are allowed this discretion, or may already be established, as is the
case with the Permanent Court of International Arbitration.
The fundamental difference between arbitration and conciliation is
that the decision or "award" of the arbitrators is deemed to be binding
upon the states parties to the arbitration. Failing fraud, duress or some
fundamental error of fact or jurisdiction of the arbitrators, the parties are
bound to respect the award by virtue of the original commitment to sub-
mit to arbitration.
Despite the existence of the International Court of Justice and a
number of other dispute settlement procedures, arbitration continues to
play an important role in interstate relations. It is thought to be quicker
and cheaper than judicial settlement and arbitrators can be chosen either
for their expert knowledge of a technical area or simply because the
states in question, rightly or wrongly, believe they can trust them. The
degree of control exercised by the parties to an arbitration as to timing
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and procedure is an added advantage in the eyes of those responsible for
the conduct of international relations. As long as statesmen and diplo-
mats fear being "dragged into court," a situation which most regard as
being tantamount to political defeat, arbitration will be a popular and
useful alternative to judicial proceedings.
This procedure could be a viable option and it would go further than
the present Commission mechanism by having the impartial umpire.
This, however, would not be beyond that which is confirmed in article X
of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty.
E. Judicial Settlementa24
Judicial settlement of international disputes is the most formal of
the various methods to be studied. To the surprise of the domestic law-
yer, judicial settlement is by no means the most widely employed dispute
settlement procedure in international relations. On the contrary, the ma-
jority of states have never been parties to an international judicial pro-
ceeding and many in principle would refuse to do so if the occasion
presented itself. This has led some jurists to conclude that international
law lacks genuine sanctions. It is submitted that this conclusion does not
flow from the restricted recourse to judicial settlement. First, many
other means of dispute settlement exist at the present time, in particular,
negotiation. Second, it can be plausibly argued that many disputes aris-
ing between states in the present international legal order, while they are
subject to solution according to international law, are not necessarily sus-
ceptible of judicial settlement. The course of many disputes, especially
those involving great political conflicts is not likely to be altered materi-
ally by the decision of a remote court of law. Third, the nature of judicial
proceedings, the delays, costs and formality are seen, rightly or wrongly,
as an obstacle by many states. Fourth, those responsible for the conduct
of international relations at the political level regard recourse to judicial
proceedings as a political defeat, necessary only when negotiations have
failed; at the bureaucratic level, diplomats having the primary responsi-
bility for the conduct of international relations, have a by no means un-
justified professional preference for negotiation. Finally and most
important, governments fear the absence of flexibility and loss of control
inherent in submission to judicial procedures.
For these reasons, the number of disputes settled by judicial pro-
ceedings has been relatively small. However, the influence of these deci-
sions have had a profound impact upon the development of international
law in this century. Sometimes acting as a check upon expectations,
sometimes advancing and formalizing important new rules of interna-
tional law, the decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice
224 Id. at 228-90.
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and International Court of Justice constitute one of the most significant
sources of international law today on such diverse issues as treaty law,
the law of the sea, the status of international organizations, nationality
and diplomatic protection. Another indication of the value of the judi-
cial process is the very high degree of compliance with the decisions of
international courts by states which have submitted disputes to them.
The present International Court of Justice is the direct successor of
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Unlike the latter court,
the International Court of Justice is an integral part of the United Na-
tions system, being designated as the "principal judicial organ" of the
United Nations. By virtue of the Charter, the International Court of
Justice is open to all members of the United Nations and other states on
conditions laid down by the General Assembly.225 According to the
Statute of the International Court of Justice, a document annexed to the
U.N. Charter, the Court is composed of fifteen "independent judges"
qualified for the highest national judicial office. The judges are elected by
the General Assembly and the Security Council,2 26 thus ensuring that
political and geographical representation also enter into the selection
process.
The jurisdiction of the Court is on a voluntary basis either as a result
of ad hoe submission by two states of a single dispute or on the basis of
general or qualified acceptances of the jurisdiction of the court. Canada
was among those states qualifying their acceptance of a general submis-
sion to the jurisdiction of the Court. This was withdrawn in September
1985. However, once a United Nations member has agreed to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court, it must comply with any decision in any case
to which it is a party. The General Assembly or the Security Council
may request advisory opinions from the court, as many other organs of
the United Nations with the authorization of the General Assembly.
Proceedings before the Court are governed by the Statute and by the
Rules of Court. The Court may constitute panels to hear specialized
matters or to expedite business. It may appoint assessors to assist in de-
ciding specialized issues and is authorized to "indicate" interim measures
of protection where circumstances so warrant.
The recent United States declaration of April 6, 1984 regarding dis-
putes concerning Central American states which is a further reservation
to its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, would play no part here.
The original United States declaration of acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction includes a reservation which states that disputes are excluded
which relate to matters that are essentially within the jurisdiction of the
225 U.N. CHARTER art. 4.
226 STATUTE OF THE I.CJ. art. 2.
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United States of America as determined by that state. This has been
further amended to include disputes of a political character. Clearly, it
could be argued that this relates to pollution and by further extension to
the water quantity issues being considered here. This exclusion could
also be invoked by Canada on the basis of reciprocity.
Canada and the United States have gone recently to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice over the Gulf of Maine case. This would show a
will to present the Court with a compromis and abide by the decision.
Should this recourse be necessary and no other alternative present itself,
there is no reason why it could not be utilized. From the enforcement
point of view, much depends upon the will of the parties to comply with
the decision. Even though the Security Council of the United Nations
may be called upon to enforce the judgments, under article 94 of the
United Nations Charter, this would be subject to the use of the veto
power by the five permanent members.
F The American Bar Association-Canadian Bar Association Proposal
In 1979, the ABA and CBA made a proposal that the two govern-
ments should ratify two treaties that would facilitate the settlement of
disputes between them. 27 To date they have not been ratified. The two
treaties deal respectively with Equal Access and Remedy for Trans-
frontier Pollution and the Third Party Settlement of Disputes.
4. New Treaty Agreements
One option would be to amend the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909
to provide for water quantity management on the basis of equitable par-
ticipation and a compulsory adjudication process put in place to settle
any conflicts. Another option is to produce a new treaty, perhaps enti-
tled the Great Lakes Water Quantity Agreement. This new agreement, if
ratified by Canada and the United States, could provide for the principles
of water quantity management discussed earlier. Such an agreement
could provide the framework for settling diversion and consumptive use
issues.
No solution will be effective until both Canada and the United
States give these issues the high priority that they deserve. Both water
planning and control must be improved and a step in the right direction
may be to set up a federal water authority in each country. These federal
agencies could in turn assist in founding a joint Canada-United States
management body for surveillance and mediation functions. It could ini-
tiate studies stressing regional and transboundary collaboration and es-
227 Alexandrowicz & Smith, Settlement of Dispute Mechanisms, - QUEEN'S L. J. - (1985)
(not yet in print).
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sentially under guidelines established by the two states develop a more
systematic approach to the management of the Great Lakes Basin.
There are clearly reciprocal incentives for Canada and the United
States to cooperate in this area. Both need the active assistance of the
other to achieve good management objectives. If the Great Lakes are to
be improved both states must work together for the common good. Na-
tionalism must give way to the optimal utilization that is best in accord
with the ecological considerations.
E. Conclusions
In any matter concerning two states the crux of the settlement of the
dispute is the will of the parties to be reasonable in finding a solution
agreeable to both sides. Enforcement is lacking in the traditional domes-
tic law sense. The sharing of a common resource - water - is a pre-
cious task. It must be done with careful management. Canada and the
United States have a responsibility, not just to one another as subjects of
international law, but to Canadians, Americans and other members of
the human race to protect the environment and to reduce to a minimum
adverse effects of the utilization of a common indivisible resource.
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